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Abstract
We propose a complete version of the sequential equilibrium (CSE) and its alternative solution
concept (WCSE) for general nite-period games with observed actions. The sequential equilibrium
(SE) is not a complete solution concept in that it might not be a Nash equilibrium in the general
games that allow a continuum of types and strategies. The CSE is always a Nash equilibrium and
is equivalent to the SE in nite games. So, the CSE is a complete solution concept in the general
games as a version of the SE. The WCSE is a weak, but simple version of the CSE. It is also
a complete solution concept and functions as an alternative solution concept to the CSE. Their
relation with converted versions of the perfect equilibrium and the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
are discussed.
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1 Introduction
We propose a complete version of the sequential equilibrium and its alternative solution
concept. Kreps and Wilson (1982) introduced the sequential equilibrium in the setting of
nite games that allow only a nite number of types and strategies. As shown by them, the
sequential equilibrium is appropriate for the nite games. However, it might be inappropriate
for general games that can have a continuum of types and strategies. This inappropriateness
makes the sequential equilibrium an incomplete solution concept in the general games1 . In
the present study, we attempt to develop a complete solution concept in the general games
by improving the sequential equilibrium. Then, we simplify this complete solution concept
to nd its weak version as its alternative solution concept.
Section 2 illustrates the incompleteness of the sequential equilibrium in the general games
with an example. Section 3 formulates a general nite-period games with observed actions.
Section 4 introduces new concepts, complete beliefs and sequential convergency, and lays
the foundations of a complete version of the sequential equilibrium. Section 5 denes the
complete version of the sequential equilibrium and derives some results on it. Section 6
suggests an alternative solution concept to the complete version and analyzes their relation.
Section 7 concludes with the discussion about how these two solution concepts are related
to converted versions of the perfect equilibrium and the perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
1 In this sense, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991a) is also an incomplete
solution concept in the general games.
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2 Example: Incompleteness of the sequential equilib-
rium in general games
Consider the information transmission game introduced by Crawford and Sobel (1982).
There are two players; a sender and a receiver. The sender is assigned a type  that is
a random variable from a uniform distribution on [0; 1] and makes a signal s 2 [0; 1] to the
receiver. Then, after observing the signal s, the receiver chooses his action a 2 [0; 1]. The
sender has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function US(; a; b) =  (  (a+ b))2 where
b > 0 and the receiver has another von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function UR(; a)
=  (   a)2.
In this game, the senders strategy s() =  and the receivers strategy a(s) = maxfs 
b; 0g are a sequential equilibrium together with the receivers system of beliefs (maxfs  
b; 0g; s) = 1 which denotes that given a signal s, the type maxfs   b; 0g would be assigned
to the sender with probability one. This is because the strategies s() =  and a(s) =
maxfs b; 0g are sequentially rational with respect to the system of beliefs (maxfs b; 0g; s)
= 1. In addition, under the senders strategy s() = , each signal  occurs with probability
zero, and thus every system of beliefs does not violate Bayesrule. As a result, the receivers
system of beliefs (maxfs   b; 0g; s) = 1 is consistent with the senders strategy s() = 
according to Bayes rule, and therefore these strategies and the system of beliefs are a
sequential equilibrium2 .
This sequential equilibrium, however, is not an appropriate prediction of behavior in that
2 Likewise, we can show that they are a perfect Bayesian equilibrium as well.
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the receiver makes a systematic mistake in forming her beliefs, and moreover it is not even
a Nash equilibrium. In the scenario of this equilibrium, the receiver constantly mistakes a
true type  for a wrong type maxf   b; 0g even though she expects the sender to signal
truthfully s() = . Furthermore, the receivers strategy a(s) = maxfs  b; 0g is not a best
response to the senders strategy s() = , and so this sequential equilibrium is not a Nash
equilibrium. Consequently, this sequential equilibrium is not an appropriate prediction, and
therefore it is not an appropriate solution concept in this game.
This result of the game depends mainly on the setting that the sender has a continuum
of types and signals. Accordingly, most games that have similar settings can testify that the
sequential equilibrium might not be an appropriate solution concept. Since this setting rep-
resents a general situation, there are a large class of games in the general games that include
similar settings. Therefore, we conclude that the sequential equilibrium is an incomplete
solution concept in the general games.
3 General nite-period games with observed actions
We adopt the nite-period games with observed actionsfrom Fudenberg and Tirole (1991a)
and adapt it for general games that allow innite actions and types, but nite players. Hence,
in the general nite-period games with observed actions, there are a nite number of players
denoted by i = 1; 2; :::; I. Each player i has a type i 2 i and this type is her private
information as in Harsanyi (196768). In addition, there exists a state 0 2 0 and the
players do not know an actual state when they play. Thus, each player has information
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on her type i, but no information on the other playerstypes and the state  i 2  i =
0 (i0 6=ii0). We assume that  = Ii=0i is a non-empty metric space. All players have
the same prior distribution  on  such that  is a probability measure on the class of the
Borel subsets3 Ii=0ß(i) of . For simplicity, we assume (B) > 0 for every open subset
B in .
The players play the game in periods t = 1; 2; :::; T . At each period t, all players simul-
taneously choose an action, and then their actions are revealed at the end of the period.
We assume, for simplicity, that each players available actions are independent of her type
so that each player is action space at period t is Ati regardless of her type. In addition, we
assume that At = Ii=1Ati is a nonempty metric space4 for each t. Finally, we consider only
the perfect recall games introduced by Kuhn (1950).
A strategy is dened as follows. For each i = 1; :::; I and t = 1; :::; T , let ti be a
measure from i  A1     At 1 ß(Ati) to [0; 1]. Then, a behavioral strategy i is an
ordered set of measures i = (
1
i ; :::; 
T
i ) such that i) for each (i; a
1; :::; at 1) 2 i  A1 
    At 1, ti(i; a1; :::; at 1; ) is a probability measure on ß(Ati) and ii) for every B 2
ß(Ati), 
t
i(;B) is ß(i)  (t 1t0=1Ii0=1ß(At
0
i0)) measurable. The condition i) requires that
each ti(i; a
1; :::; at 1; ) specify what to play at each information set (i; a1; :::; at 1). The
condition ii) requires that ti allow an well-dened expected utility functional dened later.
Hereafter, we simply call a behavioral strategy a strategy. Let i be the set of strategies
3 Given a metric space X, the class of the Borel sets ß(X) is the smallest class of subsets of X such that
i)ß(X) contains all open subsets of X and ii)ß(X) is closed under countable unions and complements.
4 Therefore, the space   A1      AT is a nonempty metric space. On this space, expected utility
functionals are well dened according to Ash (1972, 2.6).
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for player i and let  be the set of strategy proles, i:e:  = Ii=1i. Note that these
denitions originated from Milgrom and Weber (1985) and Balder (1988) and are adapted
for the general nite-period games with observed actions5 .
AVon Neumann-Morgenstern utility function for player i is dened as Ui : A1AT
 ! R. We assume that each Ui is bounded and Ii=0ß(i) (Tt=1Ii=1ß(Ati)) measurable,
which guarantees that Ui is integrable. In addition, we dene an expected utility functional
Ei :   ! R as
Ei(1; :::; n) =
R

R
A1
   R
AT
Ui(; a)
T (; a1; :::; aT 1; daT )    1(; da1)(d)
where for each t, t denotes the product measure of ft1; :::; tIg on Ii=1ß(Ati), i:e: t =
t1   tI . This denition of the expected utility functional makes sense according to Ash
(1972, 2.6)6 . First, since each ti is a probability measure and measurable, so is the product
measure t. Next, since Ui(; a) and 
T (; a1; :::; aT 1; daT ) areIi=0ß(i)(T 1t=1 Ii=1ß(Ati))
measurable, so is the inner part of the integral
R
AT
Ui(; a)
T (; a1; :::; aT 1; daT ), and thus
it is Ii=1ß(AT 1i ) measurable. Furthermore, the inner integral is bounded, so it is integrable
with respect to the measure T 1. Finally, we can show each part of the integral is integrable
likewise, and therefore the whole integral is well-dened.
5 For each i and t  2, the measure ti(; ) is known as a transition probability. For more information on
the transition probability, please refer to Neveu (1965, III), Ash (1972, 2.6), and Uglanov (1997).
6 Let zj be a    field of subsets of 
j for each j = 1; :::::; n. Let 1 be a probability measure on z1,
and , for each (!1; :::; !j) 2 
1     
j , let (!1; :::; !j ;B), B 2 zj+1, be a probability measure on zj+1
(j = 1; 2; :::; n  1). Assume that (!1; :::; !j ;C) is measurable for each xed C 2 zj+1. Let 
 = 
1    

n and z = z1     zn.
(1) There is a unique probability measure  on z such that for each measurable rectangle A1     An
2 z, (A1     An) =
R
A1
R
A2
   R
An
(!1; ::: ; !n 1; d!n)   (!2; d!1)1(d!1).
(2) Let f : (
;z)  ! ([0; 1];ß([0; 1])) and f  0. Then, R


fd =
R

1
   R

n
f(!1; ::: ; !n)(!1; :::
; !n 1; d!n)   1(d!1).
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Based on this expected utility functional, the Nash equilibrium by Nash (1951) is ex-
tended in the general games. The Nash equilibrium condition is used as a minimum require-
ment for a complete solution concept in the general games. Accordingly, given any solution
concept, its complete version is required to satisfy at least the Nash equilibrium condition.
Denition 1 A strategy prole  = (1    I) is a Nash equilibrium if  satises Ei() 
max0i2i Ei(
0
i;  i) for each i  I.
4 Complete beliefs and Sequential convergency
In the setting of the general games, we develop a complete version of the sequential equi-
librium. This complete version is called a complete sequential equilibrium. To be brief,
a complete sequential equilibrium is a pair of a system of complete beliefs and a strategy
prole such that i) the system of complete beliefs is consistent with the strategy prole
through a sequentially convergent sequence of strategy proles and ii) the strategy prole
is sequentially rational with respect to the system of complete beliefs7 . Thus, the complete
sequential equilibrium bases on new concepts, complete beliefs and sequential convergency.
Accordingly, this section is devoted to formulate these new concepts.
Complete beliefs are counterparts of beliefs in the sequential equilibrium. The sequential
equilibrium consists of two components, a system of beliefs and a strategy prole. The
problem with the sequential equilibrium in the general games, incompleteness, is caused by
a weakness of the beliefs. The complete sequential equilibrium solves the problem with the
7 Note that a sequential equilibrium is a pair of a system of beliefs and a strategy prole such that i) the
system of beliefs is consistent with the strategy prole and ii) the strategy prole is sequentially rational
with respect to the system of beliefs.
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sequential equilibrium by improving the weakness of the beliefs. Complete beliefs are the
improved version of the beliefs.
Denition 2 For each i and t, a probability measure ti on Ii=0ß(i)  (t 1t0=1Ii=1ß(At
0
i ))
is called a complete belief for player i at period t if ti( i  Bi) > 0 for every open set
Bi  iA1   At 1. For each t, let t denote (t1; :::; tI), then a system of complete
beliefs is an ordered set of complete beliefs  = (1; :::; T ).
The property of a system of complete beliefs depends on the property of the space
  A1     AT . Since the space is metric, any system of complete beliefs consists
of regular probability measures8 according to Theorem 1.1 in Billingsley (1968). If the
metric space is also separable and complete, then every system consists of tight measures9
according to Theorem 1.4 in Billingsley (1968). In addition, the condition for a complete
belief ti( i Bi) > 0 for every open set Bi assures that with respect to a complete belief,
we can check sequential rationality of a strategy prole in every open class of information
sets o¤ the equilibrium path as well as on the equilibrium path.
In the general games, particularly continuous games that have uncountably many types
and strategies, the sequential equilibrium concept might not well-dene a consistent relation
between a strategy prole, which is dened on the whole class of information sets at each
period, and a system of beliefs, which are dened on each information set. This is because
some information sets might have probability zero with respect to the strategy prole, which
implies those information sets are impossible to happen according to the strategy prole.
8 By Billingsley (1968), a probability measure  on ß(X) of a metric space X is dened to be regular
if for any B 2 ß(X) and " > 0, there exist a closed set G and an open set O such that G  B  O and
(O  G) < ".
9 A probability measure  onß(X) of a metric space X is tight if for any B 2ß(X), (B) is the supremum
of (K) over the compact subsets K of A.
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Therefore, the strategy prole cannot dene how those information sets occur, and thus
it cannot be consistent with any beliefs on those information sets. This explains why the
sequential equilibrium sometimes fails to exclude an inconsistent system of beliefs in the
general games. The system of complete beliefs, on the other hand, is dened on the whole
class of information sets at each period. This change of the domains makes a consistent
relation between a system of complete beliefs and a strategy prole well-dened, and as a
result, an inconsistent system of complete beliefs would be excluded.
The complete sequential equilibrium indirectly denes the consistent relation between
a system of complete beliefs and a strategy prole by using a sequence of strategy proles
that is related to both of them, as the sequential equilibrium does. Denition 3 presents
conditions for such a sequence of strategy proles that can show the consistent relation. For
notational convenience, we dene a probability measure  with respect to a strategy prole
 as
(B; ) =
R
B1
R
B2()
   R
Bt(;a1;:::;at 2)
t 1(; a1; :::; at 2; dat 1)    1(; da1)(d) (1)
for every set B 2 Ii=0ß(i) (t 1t0=1Ii=1ß(At
0
i )) where B
1 = f 2  : (; a1; :::; at 1) 2 Bg,
i:e: B1 is the projection of B onto , and for t0 = 2; :::; t, Bt
0
(~; ~a1; :::; ~at
0 2) = fat0 1 2
At
0 1 : (~; ~a1; :::; ~at
0 2; at
0 1; :::; at 1) 2 Bg, i:e: Bt0(~; ~a1; :::; ~at0 2) is the projection of B onto
f(~; ~a1; :::; ~at0 2)gAt0 1. The probability measure  is well-dened according to Ash (1972,
2.6). Furthermore, given a sequence of pairwise disjoint Borel subsets fKti;jg in iA1  
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  At 1 and a sequence of strategy proles fng, dene a measure j;n as
j;n(B) =
(B n i  [e<jKti;e; n)
( A1      At 1 n i  [e<jKti;e; n)
(2)
for each B 2 Ii=0ß(i)  (t 1t0=1Ii=1ß(At
0
i )). Then, for each i and t, if j;n is well-dened,
it will be a probability measure on Ii=0ß(i)  (t 1t0=1 Ii=1ß(At
0
i )) since so is (; n). In
detail, we have j;n(  A1      At 1) = (A
1At 1n i[e<jKti;e;n)
(A1At 1n i[e<jKti;e;n) = 1 and j;n(B)
 0 for each B 2 Ii=0ß(i)  (t 1t0=1 Ii=1 ß(At
0
i )). In addition, for any disjoint count-
able union of Borel subsets [e2EBe, we have j;n([e2EBe) = ([e2EBen i[e<jK
t
i;e;n)
(A1At 1n i[e<jKti;e;n)
=
P
e2E
(Ben i[e<jKti;e;n)
(A1At 1n i[e<jKti;e;n) =
P
e2E j;n(Be). Therefore, j;n is a probability
measure if it exists.
Denition 3 A sequence of strategy proles fng1n=1 is sequentially convergent if for each
i and t, there exists a sequence of pairwise disjoint Borel sets fKti;jgj2Jti in iA1At 1
with an index set J ti  N such that for each j, i) the probability measure j;n dened by
(2) is well-dened for every n and converges weakly10 to some probability measure j on
Ii=0ß(i)  (t 1t0=1 Ii=1ß(At
0
i )); ii) K
t
i;j =
TfGi : Gi is relatively closed in i  A1    
At 1 n [e<jKti;e and j( i  Gi) = 1g; and iii) [j2JtiKti;j is dense. Here, the sequencefKti;jg is called sequential supports of fng for player i at period t.
To resolve the abstractness of this denition, we examine how a sequentially convergent
sequence of strategy proles fng operates. First, the sequence fng denes a sequence
of probability measures f1;ng and this sequence f1;ng converges weakly to a probability
measure 1. Then, the measure 1 has the smallest support Kti;1 that is closed. Next,
the sequence fng and the support Kti;1 together dene a sequence of probability measures
f2;ng and this sequence f2;ng converges weakly to a probability measure 2. Then again,
10 A measure j;n converges weakly to j if limn !1
R
A1At 1 f(; a)dj;n(; a) =
R
A1At 1
f(; a)dj(; a) for every bounded and continuous real function f on A1     At 1.
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the measure 2 has the smallest support Kti;2 that is relatively closed in A1  At 1 n
 iKti;1. Likewise, for each j  3, the sequence fng and the supports fKti;egj 1e=1 determine
a sequence of probability measures fj;ng, a probability measure j, and the support Kti;j
until [ejKti;e becomes dense.
To sum up, a sequence of strategy proles fng is sequentially convergent if fng together
with its sequential supports fKti;jg, whose union is dense, sequentially dene a sequence of
probability measures fj;ng such that each sequence fj;ng1n=1 converges weakly to a proba-
bility measure j and j has the smallest and relatively closed support Kti;j. In particular,
the condition i) requires that fng and fKti;jg sequentially well-dene fj;ng and fjg. The
condition ii) requires that Kti;j be the smallest and relatively closed support of j so that
Kti;j is uniquely determined and every open set in K
t
i;j has positive measure with respect to
j. Finally, the condition iii) requires that the union of the supports [j2JtiKti;j be dense so
that fKti;jg lls the whole space fully enough.
The sequential equilibrium also uses a sequence of strategy proles to show the consistent
relation between a system of beliefs and a strategy prole. Concretely, it uses a convergent
sequence of totally mixed strategy proles. Here, a strategy prole is dened to be totally
mixed if for each t, we have
t
i(i; a
1; :::; at 1;B) > 0 for every (i; a1; :::; at 1) 2 i  A1 
   At 1 and for every open set B  Ati. In nite games, a convergent sequence of totally
mixed strategy proles is sequentially convergent and well-denes the consistent relation as
shown in Kreps and Wilson (1982). In general games, however, it might not be sequentially
convergent and might not well-dene the consistent relation as shown in Example 1.
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Example 1 Consider the game in Crawford and Sobel (1982) again. Dene the senders
strategy n as n(;B) = 1n+1 l(B) +
n2
n+1
l(B \ [0; 1
n
]) for every  2 [0; 1] and B 2 ß([0; 1])
where l : ß([0; 1])  ! [0; 1] is a Lebesgue measure. Then, the sequence fng is convergent
and each n is totally mixed. However, it is not sequentially convergent, and moreover, it
does not well-dene the consistent relation.
Although a convergent sequence of totally mixed strategy proles is not su¢ cient to be
sequentially convergent, it is still useful to construct a sequentially convergent sequence in
the general games. Example 2 demonstrates this construction. Consequently, Example 2
provides su¢ cient conditions for a sequence of strategy proles to be sequentially convergent.
Example 2 Suppose that a sequence of strategy proles fng1n=1 satises the following two
conditions. First, each n in the sequence is totally mixed. Second, there exist a set of
strategy proles fege2E[fg where E  N and a sequence of positive real numbers f"ng such
that for each n,n = (1 
P
e2E("n)
e)   +
P
e2E("n)
e  e and "n converges to zero. Then,
the sequence fng is sequentially convergent.
The following Lemmas 1 and 2 reveal properties of the sequentially convergent sequence
of strategy proles. Specically, Lemma 1 shows that every open class of information sets has
positive measure with respect to probability measures induced by a sequentially convergent
sequence. Lemma 2 proves that a linear combination of probability measures induced by
a sequentially convergent sequence can be a probability measure itself. These two lemmas
establish a way to dene a system of complete beliefs with respect to a sequentially convergent
sequence of strategy proles.
Lemma 1 If a sequence of strategy proles fng1n=1 is sequentially convergent, then given
i and t, for any nonempty open set Oi 2 ß(i)  (t 1t0=1Ii0=1ß(At
0
i0)), there exists a set ~K
t
i;j
among the sequential supports fKti;jg of fng such that j( i  ( ~Kti;j \ Oi)) > 0 where the
probability measure j;n dened by (2) converges weakly to j.
11
Proof. Since [j2JtiKti;j is dense in i  A1      At 1, there exists a set ~Kti;j in fKti;jg
such that ~Kti;j \ Oi 6= ?. It su¢ ces to show that j( i  ( ~Kti;j \ Oi)) > 0. Let a subspace
Xi be i  A1      At 1 n [e<j Kti;e. From the denition, ~Kti;j is relatively closed in Xi.
Since Xi\Oi is relatively open in Xi, the set ~Kti;j n (Xi\Oi) (= ~Kti;j nOi) is relatively closed
in Xi. Since ~Kti;j * ~Kti;j nOi and j is a probability measure, we have j( i  ( ~Kti;j nOi))
< 1 according to the condition ii) in Denition 3. Therefore, we have j( i  ( ~Kti;j \Oi))
= 1  ( i  ( ~Kti;j nOi)) > 0.
Lemma 2 Let a sequence of strategy proles fng1n=1 be sequentially convergent with sequen-
tial supports fKti;jgj2Jti and let a function p : J ti  ! [0; 1] be a probability mass function, i:e:P
j2Jti p(j) = 1 and p(j)  0 for each j. Given i and t, for each n 2 N, suppose that a set
function n on Ii=0ß(i) (t 1t0=1Ii=1ß(At
0
i )) satises
n(B) =
P
j2Jti p(j)j;n(B)
for every B where j;n is dened by (2). Then, each n is a probability measure. Moreover,
n converges weakly to the probability measure  =
P
j2Jti p(j)  j such that for each j, j;n
converges weakly to j.
Proof. The rst result follows from the fact that each j;n is a probability measure on
Ii=0ß(i)(t 1t0=1Ii=1ß(At
0
i )). That is, we have n(A1At 1) =
P
j2Jti p(j)
t
ij;n(
A1      At 1) = 1 and n(B) =
P
j2Jti p(j)j;n(B)  0 for each B 2 
I
i=0ß(i) 
(t 1t0=1Ii=1ß(At
0
i )). To show countable additivity, let [e2EBe be a pairwise disjoint countable
union of Borel sets. Then,
n([e2EBe) =
P
j2Jti p(j)j;n([e2EBe) =
P
j2Jti
P
e2E p(j)j;n(Be)
=
P
e2E
P
j2Jti j;n(Be) since the series is absolutely convergent, =
P
e2E n(Be).
For the second assertion, since a sequence of strategy proles fng is sequentially con-
vergent with the sequential supports fKti;jg, there exists a probability measure j such that
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j;n converges weakly to j and j( i Kti;j) = 1. For notational convenience, let a space
X be A1     At 1. Then, for any arbitrary bounded and continuous real function f
on X, we have
lim
n !1
Z
X
fdn = lim
n !1
Z
X
fd
P
j2Jti p(j)j;n
=
P
j2J p(j) limn !1
Z
X
fdj;n + lim
n !1
Z
X
fd
P
j2Jti nJ p(j)j;n for any nite subset J  J
t
i ,
=
P
j2J p(j)
Z
 iKti;j
fdj + lim
n !1
Z
X
fd
P
j2Jti nJ p(j)j;n =
P
j2Jti p(j)
Z
 iKti;j
fdj.
The last equality holds because limn !1
R
X
fd
P
j2Jti nJ p(j)j;n converges to zero as J ap-
proaches to J ti . Therefore, the measure n =
P
j2Jti p(j)j;n converges weakly to  =P
j2Jti p(j)j. Finally, the result that
P
j2Jti p(j)j is a probability measure on 
I
i=0ß(i)
(t 1t0=1Ii=1ß(At
0
i )) comes from the observation that each j is a probability measure.
Proposition 1 combines Lemmas 1 and 2 and concludes that given a probability mass
function, a sequentially convergent sequence uniquely denes a system of complete beliefs.
Proposition 1 Let a sequence of strategy proles fng1n=1 be sequentially convergent. Then,
given i and t, fng has a unique sequence of sequential supports fKti;jgj2Jti . In addition, let
a function p : J ti  ! [0; 1] be a probability mass function. Then, fng and p together dene
exactly one probability measure  on Ii=0ß(i)  (t 1t0=1Ii=1ß(At
0
i )) according to the same
way as in Lemma 2. Furthermore, the probability measure  is a complete belief for player
i at period t.
Proof. The uniqueness of the sequence of sequential supports results from the condition ii)
in Denition 3; that is, each Kti;j is the smallest and relatively closed subset in iA1   
At 1n[e<jKti;e such that j( iKti;j) = 1. The other results directly follow from Lemmas
1 and 2.
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5 Complete sequential equilibrium
In this section, we provide a formal denition of the complete sequential equilibrium based on
the results from the previous section and examine its properties. First, we dene a complete
assessment that is a counterpart of the assessment in the sequential equilibrium.
Denition 4 An ordered pair of a system of complete beliefs and a strategy prole (; ) is
called a complete assessment.
The complete sequential equilibrium, as a complete version of the sequential equilibrium,
preserves all the conditions for the sequential equilibrium. Thus, it requires a complete
assessment to satisfy both i) consistency and ii) sequential rationality. The rst condition,
consistency, is formulated in Denition 5.
Denition 5 A complete assessment (; ) is consistent if there exists a sequentially con-
vergent sequence of strategy proles fng such that i) n converges weakly11 to  and ii)
each complete belief ti satises
ti(B) =
P
j2Jti (
1
2
)#fe2J
t
i :ej and e<sup Jti gj(B) (3)
for every set B 2 Ii=0ß(i) (t 1t0=1Ii=1ß(At
0
i )) where the index set J
t
i and each probability
measure j are dened in the same way as in Denition 3 and #fe 2 J ti : e  j and
e < sup J tig denotes the number of elements e in J ti such that e  j and e < sup J ti .
Denition 5 makes sense according to Proposition 1. Intuitive explanation of this de-
nition is presented later when we compare the complete sequential equilibrium with the
sequential equilibrium. Note that Denition 5 designates the probability mass function p as
p(j) = (1
2
)#fe2J
t
i :ej and e<sup Jti g for each j 2 J ti . This designation of the probability mass
11 n converges weakly to  if
R

R
A1
   R
AT
f(; a)Tn (; a
1; :::; aT 1; daT )   1n(; da1)d() converges
to
R

R
A1
   R
AT
f(; a)T (; a1; :::; aT 1; daT )   1(; da1)d() for every bounded and continuous real
function f on A1     AT .
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function guarantees that a sequentially convergent sequence denes a unique system of com-
plete beliefs by Proposition 1, and consequently it simplies the denition.
Next, the second condition of the complete sequential equilibrium, sequential ratio-
nality, is dened in Denition 6. Let 	 be the set of all systems of complete beliefs.
For notational convenience, given i and t, dene a conditional expected utility functional
Eti : 	ß(i) (t 1t0=1Ii0=1ß(At
0
i0))  ! R as ti( iGi) Eti (;Gi; ) =
R
 iGi
R
At
  R
AT
Ui(; a)
T (; a1; :::; aT 1; daT )   t(; a1; :::; at 1; dat)dti(; a1; :::; at 1).
Denition 6 A strategy prole  is sequentially rational with respect to a system of
complete beliefs  if for each i and t, we have Eti (;Gi; )  Eti (;Gi; (0i;  i)) for every
0i 2 i and for every Gi 2 ß(i) (t 1t0=1Ii0=1ß(At
0
i0)) such that 
t
i( i Gi) > 0.
Here, Gi denotes a class of player is information sets at period t. Thus, the sequential
rationality requires, responding to the other playersstrategies  i, each player i to play her
best response i, which induces the greatest expected utility conditional on reaching a class
of information sets Gi that have positive measure with respect to the system of complete
beliefs , i:e: ti( i Gi) > 0. As a result, no player prefers to change her strategy at any
open class of information sets. Note that Kreps and Wilson (1982) described the sequential
rationality as the condition under which taking the beliefs as xed, no player prefers at
any information set to change his part of the strategy.Therefore, Denition 6 adapts the
sequential rationality from the sequential equilibrium for the general nite-period games
with observed actions by replacing any information setwith any open class of information
sets.
Denition 7 denes the complete sequential equilibrium.
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Denition 7 A complete assessment (; ) is a complete sequential equilibrium if (; )
is both 1) consistent and 2) sequentially rational.
Here are the results on the complete sequential equilibrium.
Proposition 2 Every complete sequential equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The result directly follows from the denitions.
Proposition 3 shows the relation between the complete sequential equilibrium and the
sequential equilibrium in nite games. For notational simplicity, we dene a system of beliefs
_12 associated with a system of complete beliefs  as _(). That is, _() is a system of
beliefs inducing the same distributions on each information set as  does. We can see that
in nite games, every system of complete beliefs uniquely determines the associated system
of beliefs _().
Proposition 3 In nite games, a complete assessment (; ) is consistent if and only if the
assessment ( _(); ) is consistent.
Proof. The result directly follows from the denitions.
Proposition 3 implies that in nite games, the complete sequential equilibrium satises
two intuitive notions of consistency introduced by Kreps and Wilson (1982); Structural
consistency and Lexicographic consistency. According to them, the structural consistency
is dened as a consistency criterion under which beliefs of the players should reect the
informational structure of the game. In addition, the lexicographic consistency is meant
to be another consistency criterion under which all players should hold the same sequence
12 Kreps and Wilson (1982) dened a system of beliefs _ as a function from a set of all decision nodes to
[0; 1] such that
P
x2h _(x) = 1 for each information set h.
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of hypotheses to play a game and whenever they fail to apply the most likely hypothesis
to their situation, they should apply the next most likely hypothesis. Kreps and Wilson
showed the sequential equilibrium satises these two consistency criteria in nite games.
Since the complete sequential equilibrium is equivalent to the sequential equilibrium in the
nite games, the complete sequential equilibrium also satises these two consistency criteria
in the nite games.
Theorem 1 is a corollary of Proposition 3. Moreover, Theorem 1 and Proposition 2 evi-
dence that the complete sequential equilibrium is indeed a complete version of the sequential
equilibrium. That is, the complete sequential equilibrium is a complete solution concept in
the general games as a version of the sequential equilibrium.
Theorem 1 In nite games, a complete assessment (; ) is a complete sequential equilib-
rium if and only if the assessment ( _(); ) is a sequential equilibrium.
6 Alternative solution concept: Weak complete sequen-
tial equilibrium
Next, we introduce an alternative solution concept to the complete sequential equilibrium.
The complete sequential equilibrium has many advantages in that it is at least a Nash
equilibrium and in nite games, it is equivalent to the sequential equilibrium. It is, however,
rather complicated. Moreover, in practice, a solution concept that is weaker, but simpler
than the complete sequential equilibrium is reasonable enough to make plausible predictions
as Fudenberg and Tirole (1991a) indicated. Therefore, we attempt to develop a weak, but
simple version of the complete sequential equilibrium as its alternative solution concept.
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The complexity of the complete sequential equilibrium arises mainly from its consistency
condition. Hence, we can develop a weak, but simple version of the complete sequential
equilibrium by relaxing its consistency condition. At length, we impose restrictions only
on the equilibrium path, and thus no restriction o¤ the equilibrium path. This version of
the consistency is called weak consistency and is formulated in Denition 8. For notational
convenience, we use the same probability measure  dened by (1)13 .
Denition 8 A complete assessment (; ) is weakly consistent if i) for every i, we have
1i =  and ii) for each i and t  2, there exists pti 2 (0; 1] such that ti(B) = pti  (B; ) for
every Borel subset B in  i Kti where Kti =
TfGi : Gi is closed in i  A1     At 1
and ( i Gi; ) = 1g.
Then, the alternative solution concept which is called a weak complete sequential equilib-
rium is dened as follows.
Denition 9 A complete assessment (; ) is a weak complete sequential equilibrium
if (; ) is both 1) weakly consistent and 2) sequentially rational.
Here are the results on the weak complete sequential equilibrium. Theorem 2 reveals the
relation among the three equilibria; the complete sequential equilibrium, the weak complete
sequential equilibrium, and the Nash equilibrium. This theorem conrms that the weak com-
plete sequential equilibrium is indeed a weak, but simple version of the complete sequential
equilibrium.
13 That is, given any strategy prole  and for each set B 2 Ii=0ß(i) (t 1t0=1Ii=1ß(At
0
i )),
(B; ) =
R
B1
R
B2()
   R
Bt(;a1;:::;at 2)
t 1(; a1; :::; at 2; dat 1)    1(; da1)(d)
where B1 = f : (; a1; :::; at 1) 2 Bg and Bt0(~; ~a1; :::; ~at0 2) = fat0 1 : (~; ~a1; :::; ~at0 2; at0 1; :::; at 1) 2 Bg
for t0 = 2; :::; t.
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Theorem 2 Every complete sequential equilibrium is a weak complete sequential equilib-
rium, and every weak complete sequential equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The results directly follow from the denitions.
Theorem 2 is especially useful in practice. In order to nd a complete sequential equilib-
rium, we need to check only on weak complete sequential equilibria, which is simple, thus can
be found easily. Consider the example by Crawford and Sobel (1982) again. We can see that
partition equilibria found by them are weak complete sequential equilibria, and furthermore
they are actually complete sequential equilibria. With the exception of a solution set of
measure zero, there is no other weak complete sequential equilibria. Therefore, according to
Theorem 2, these are all of the complete sequential equilibria in this game with the exception
of a solution set of measure zero.
The next result concerns the relation between the weak complete sequential equilibrium
and the weak sequential equilibrium introduced by Myerson (1991, 4.3). Recall that for each
system of complete beliefs , _() denotes a system of beliefs inducing the same distributions
on each information set as  does.
Proposition 4 In nite games, a complete assessment (; ) is a weak complete sequential
equilibrium if and only if the assessment ( _(); ) is a weak sequential equilibrium.
Proof. The result directly follows from the denitions.
In a word, the weak complete sequential equilibrium is equivalent to the weak sequential
equilibrium in nite games. Therefore, Proposition 4 together with Theorem 2, which proves
a weak complete sequential equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, show that the weak complete
sequential equilibrium is in fact a complete version of the weak sequential equilibrium.
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7 Complements and comments
In nite games, the perfect equilibrium, introduced by Selten (1975), and the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, formulated by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991a), are closely related to the sequential
equilibrium in that every perfect equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium and every sequen-
tial equilibrium is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium14 . These equilibrium concepts can be
converted for the general games. Then, it is natural to ask whether their converted versions
maintain their close relation in the general games. Hence, as a complement to the previous
study, this section answers this question and shows they do not.
We rst dene a converted version of the perfect equilibrium.
Denition 10 For " > 0 and a totally mixed strategy prole , an "  -constrained
equilibrium15 is a totally mixed strategy prole "() such that for each i, the strategy "i ()
solves maxi Ei(i; 
"
 i()) subject to i = "i+(1 ")0i for some 0i 2 i. A strategy prole 
is a perfect equilibrium if there exists a sequence of "n n-constrained equilibria f"n(n)g
such that i) "n(n) converges weakly to  and ii) "n converges to zero.
That is, a strategy prole  is a perfect equilibrium if there exists a sequence of totally
mixed strategy proles f"n(n)g such that i) the sequence f"n(n)g converges weakly to
the strategy prole  and ii) each strategy prole "n(n) in the sequence constitutes mutual
best responses under some constraint that disappears gradually. According to this denition,
a perfect equilibrium might not be a complete sequential equilibrium or a weak complete
sequential equilibrium. This is because in the continuous games, which belong to the general
14 The second part of this statement is true only in perfect recall games. That is, in imperfect recall
games, a sequential equilibrium might not be a perfect Baysian equilibrium.
15 This "  -constrained equilibrium is named after the "-constrained equilibrium in Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991b, 8.4.1)
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games, convergency of strategy proles does not mean convergency of expected utilities if
utility functions are unbounded or discontinuous. As a result, a perfect equilibrium could
fail to be even a Nash equilibrium, and therefore it could fail to be a complete sequential
equilibrium or a weak complete sequential equilibrium.
Next, we dene a converted version of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium and call it a
complete equilibrium.
Denition 11 A complete assessment (; ) is a complete equilibrium if (; ) is both
reasonably consistent and sequentially rational.
In other words, the complete equilibrium is a complete assessment which satises i) that
the system of complete beliefs is reasonably consistent with the strategy prole and ii) that
the strategy prole is sequentially rational with respect to the system of complete beliefs.
The denition of reasonable consistency is as follows. For notational convenience, we dene a
probability measure  with respect to a system of complete beliefs  and a strategy prole 
as  (B;; ) =
R
Bt 1
R
Bt(;a1;:::;at 2) 
t 1(; a1; :::; at 2; dat 1)t 1i (; a
1; :::; at 2) for every set
B 2 Ii=0ß(i) (t 1t0=1Ii=1ß(At
0
i )) where B
t 1 = f(; a1; :::; at 2) : (; a1; :::; at 1) 2 Bg and
Bt(~; ~a1; :::; ~at 2) = fat 1 : (~; ~a1; :::; ~at 2; at 1) 2 Bg.
Denition 12 A complete assessment (; ) is reasonably consistent if i) for every i,
we have 1i =  and ii) for each i and t  2, there exists pti 2 (0; 1] such that ti(B)
= pti   (B;; ) for every Borel subset B in  i  Kti where Kti =
TfGi : Gi is closed in
i  A1     At 1 and  ( i Gi;; ) = 1g.
That is, a system of complete beliefs (; ) is reasonably consistent if each complete belief
ti and the strategy prole  together dene the distribution of the complete belief of the next
period t+1i over the class of information sets K
t
i that is the smallest and closed support of 
t
i
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and . According to this denition, the consistency in the complete sequential equilibrium
does not means the reasonable consistency in the complete equilibrium, but the reasonable
consistency means the weak consistency in the weak complete sequential equilibrium. This
happens because the consistency and the reasonable consistency place di¤erent restrictions
o¤ the equilibrium path while the weak consistency places no restriction. Therefore, a
complete sequential equilibrium might not be a complete equilibrium even though a complete
equilibrium is always a weak complete sequential equilibrium.
Note that Denition 12 covers only the rst condition out of the three consistency con-
ditions for the perfect Bayesian equilibrium by Fudenberg and Tirole (1991a). Thus, it does
not cover the no-signaling-what-you-dont-know conditions that restrict beliefs o¤ the
equilibrium path. Basically, these no-signaling-what-you-dont-know conditions function as
restrictions to make the perfect Bayesian equilibrium close to the sequential equilibrium.
In the general games, however, the reasonable consistency, which is a converted version of
the rst condition for the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, already di¤ers from the consistency,
which is a converted version of the consistency condition for the sequential equilibrium.
Thus, no-signaling-what-you-dont-know conditions would not function as well as they do in
the nite games. Accordingly, these conditions are excluded in Denition 12 for the sake of
simplicity.
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